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1. Introduction 
1.1 Intro 
The hospital-reform anno 2002 included, other than the change to governmental 
ownership, a wish to in a larger extent use marked mechanisms and private actors in 
the health system. The idea was to try stimulating cost effectiveness trough 
competition (St.meld.nr.5 2003-2004). The private actors could be suppliers of entire 
treatments as for example surgical interventions or input in treatment processes such 
as laboratory tests and diagnostic radiology (Hagen, Iversen et al. 2007). 
The use of markets and private actors is based on economic theories that competitive 
markets are more efficient than monopolistic behaviour. By introducing more actors 
to the market we get competition, and this could again lead to more efficient use of 
resources (Varian 1993) but also selection problems (Ellis 1998). 
In this paper I will look at  
1. If, and to what extent, privatization and competition within the health care 
service has effected the costs.  
2. If, and to what extent, privatization and competition has led to selection of 
patients. 
The data material is primarily from a questionnaire sent out to the regional health 
enterprises, and data from the Norwegian patient register. This data is primarily from 
the years 2002 until 2006.  
The analysis is based on data from day-surgical treatments performed by private 
commercial hospitals in the period 2002-2005. The prices the regional health 
enterprises are paying for the treatments (percentage of full DRG) are used as an 
 6 
indicator for the regional health enterprises’ costs, while the age mix of patients is 
used as an indicator for patient selection. 
1.2 The Norwegian health care system 
I will start out by presenting the main elements of the Norwegian health care system 
with the emphasis on recent reforms embracing private providers of health care 
services.  
1.2.1 Structure 
The health care system in Norway is financed primarily by taxes. This means that 
health services are “free” for the population due to the tax-funding. Some out of 
pocket payment is also represented, but most of these payments are related to 
consultations with specialists, general practitioners and ambulatory care (Johnsen 
2006).  
Today the Norwegian health care system is organized on a national level, a regional 
level and a local level (Johnsen 2006). The organizations treating patients are 
primarily owned and financed by the government, except for private commercial 
hospitals. 
The municipalities have responsibility at the local level. The responsibilities consist 
of primary care, school health services, general medical treatment, nursing, nursing 
homes and home nursing (Johnsen 2006). The municipalities are funded by the 
government through block-financing.  
The counties are only responsible for the dental care, as they due to the hospital 
reform in 2002 lost their responsibility for the specialist care to the central 
government.  
The overall responsibility for health care services in Norway rests at the national 
level. The Ministry of Health and Care Services is responsible for the outline of the 
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national health policy as well as preparing reforms and proposals for legislation 
(Johnsen 2006). 
Recent reforms 
List Patient System (LPS) / Regular General Practitioner Scheme (RGP) 
The list patient system was presented in 1990 and started as an evaluation project in 
Tromsø, Trondheim, Lillehammer and Åsnes. In 1997 the government decided to 
implement the list patient system throughout the country. After a series of hearing 
rounds, the government officially implemented the necessary changes from 1. June 
2001 (Ot.Prp.nr.99 1998-1999). The goal of the reform was to improve the quality in 
the primary care, and for the public to have one primary physician.  
The list patient system also included that all primary physicians within the system 
should be private actors instead of being employed by the municipalities. These 
physicians are financed with a 30% pr capita payment from the local government, 
and a 70% fee-for-service payment. Of the fee-for-service payment, 40% are from the 
National Insurance Scheme, and the rest are out of pocket payments from the patients 
(Grytten, Skau et al. 2005). 
Introduction of Activity Based Financing (ABF) 
From the last part of the 1980s and to 1997, the payments to somatic hospitals were a 
combination of block-grants and earmarked resources. The earmarked resources were 
intended as a way of prioritizing patient-groups. The block-grant could to be used as 
the hospital wanted. Assumed the block-grant is fixed with hard budged constraints, 
cost control would be achievable.   
In 1997 the funding of somatic hospitals was changed to a partly activity based 
financing (ABF). The major point with this change was that 30 percent of the block 
grant should be related to hospital activity. This share was raised gradually to 60 
percent in 2003, reduced to 40 percent in 2004, raised again to 60 percent in 2005, 
and reduced to 40 percent in 2006. Percentages are presented in Figure 1-1.  
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Figure 1-1 Activity based financing 
One other important legislation concerning the activity based financing is the Patient 
right legislation, and the right to “free hospital choice”; the patients could choose 
provider of health care services.  
The reasons for implementing an activity based financing was first to increase the 
number of elective treatments to fulfil the waiting list guarantee. Second, to make 
sure that the counties spend money meant for health care on health care, instead of 
other areas they were responsible for i.e. schools and transportation. Third, block 
grants, without any activity measures to hospitals were seen as an inefficient way of 
financing (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2004a). 
With ABF came a governance problem, and a blame game over the responsibilities 
for increasing deficits at the county level (Magnussen, Hagen et al. 2007). To deal 
with these problems, the hospital reform of 2002 was implemented. 
1.2.2 The Hospital Reform 2002 
In 2002 the central government took over the ownership of public hospitals and 
specialist care institutions in Norway from the counties (Ot.Prp.nr.66 2001).  
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The reason for this reform was to address some of the problems within the 
Norwegian health care system. The main problems were; the long waiting lists for 
elective surgery, the lack of equity in the supply of hospital services, and a lack of 
financial responsibility and transparency that led to a blaming-game between the 
counties and the central government (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006). The reform included 
that the Minister of Health was given the responsibility for the management of 
specialist care, instead of the counties. The central government divided the country in 
five regions called regional health enterprises (RHE (or regional health authorities, 
RHA)), to govern and coordinate the health care system. All hospitals in the different 
regions were transformed to health enterprises, as independent legal objects with 
responsibilities for personnel and capital (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006). These actions 
created a more centralized hospital sector, with state ownership and the minister 
fiscally responsible (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006).  
The regional level consists of the five regional health enterprises.  
• Northern Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Nord) 
• Central Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Midt) 
• Western Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Vest) 
• Southern Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Sør) 
• Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Øst) 
The regions are responsible for the specialized health care provision. This includes 
somatic and mental health care as well as; laboratory services, radiology and 
ambulatory services. The regional health authorities own the health enterprises in 
their region (Johnsen 2006). 
The Southern Norway Regional Health Authority and the Eastern Norway Regional 
Health Authority are currently being merged. The new large region has got a new 
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board of directors, but is not in charge of the new region yet. In this paper the two 
regions are held separately.  
1.3 Private actors 
The Norwegian health care system includes both private not-for-profit and private 
profit-making actors. Private sector services are in most cases fully embedded in the 
public system, with some exceptions. Not-for-profit agencies typically include 
hospitals or institutions set up as trusts that, in principle, are financed and seen as an 
integrated part of the public health services, i.e. the diaconal trust owned by the 
Norwegian church. Private profit-making actors have a subordinate role within the 
Norwegian health care system and were established primarily to complement publicly 
funded services, for example, plastic surgery (Johnsen 2006). Private hospitals must 
have a permit to treat patients and the regional health authorities make deals with 
private hospitals to treat patients (Johnsen 2006). 
1.3.1 The rise of a market for private health-services 
In the Norwegian healthcare system there have always been some private providers of 
health services. Private non-commercial hospitals, as for example the diaconal 
hospital “Diakonhjemmet”, has existed beside the public providers for health care 
services, and often had a function as a local-hospital. In the Oslo and Akershus area, 
the private commercial hospitals have existed since the 1990s. This is also one of the 
reasons that many of the private hospitals are located in this area. 
Private contract specialists have also played a role in the Norwegian health care 
service. In the 1990s the private contract specialists were important healthcare 
providers (Midttun and Hagen 2006). Treatment processes such as laboratory tests 
and diagnostic radiology have in a long time been provided by private actors (Hagen, 
Iversen et al. 2007).  
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Free hospital choice was implemented from 2001 for the public hospitals. From 
1.september 2004 these rights were expanded to also include private commercial 
hospitals which had contracts with one (or more) of the Regional Health Authorities. 
Introduction of DRG 
In day-surgery the DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) system was implemented from 
1999 (Lian 2003), private commercial hospitals were implemented in the system from 
2001 and may be the reason for the extended use of private commercial hospitals.   
1.3.2 The privatization 
In the Norwegian Official Report 2003:1(NOU 2003:1) the ideas on privatization of 
specialist health care services are presented. It states a premise that the private sector 
should play a role in the specialist health care, because of the positive effects of 
competition, and the corrective role to the public health care. The regional health 
authorities could use the private actors as a supplement and an alternative to the 
production in their own health enterprises. Private actors could also assist a greater 
diversity in ways of organizing the health care system. The use of private actors will 
also give the patients a choice of where they want to be treated, and contribute to 
expand the capacity in the treatments where private actors can use equipment and 
personnel more efficiently than the public sector. The report also states that a major 
disadvantage of private actors is the uneven geographical distribution. The highest 
concentrations of private actors are in the eastern parts of Norway and around the big 
cities.  
Day-surgery by private commercial hospitals 
We can see that the private commercial hospitals are mostly established in and 
around the big cities in Norway. Hence, patients in these areas would use the private 
hospitals more frequently than rural areas. 
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To test this hypothesis the percentage of private production versus total production 
was calculated. The data are patient-data and describes the county the patients are 
living in. The results are presented in Table 1-1. 
Table 1-1. Percentage of private production vs. total production 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Østfold 10,29 % 10,61 % 11,96 % 12,01 % 
Akershus 37,56 % 18,28 % 11,76 % 12,50 % 
Oslo 18,87 % 17,70 % 11,61 % 12,18 % 
Hedmark 2,66 % 1,93 % 3,30 % 4,00 % 
Oppland 1,69 % 1,75 % 3,70 % 6,24 % 
Buskerud 8,38 % 11,97 % 8,19 % 7,92 % 
Vestfold 4,27 % 6,91 % 4,56 % 4,96 % 
Telemark 4,91 % 5,07 % 1,81 % 1,87 % 
Aust-Agder 0,76 % 1,24 % 0,86 % 0,73 % 
Vest-Agder 1,96 % 2,27 % 1,25 % 1,37 % 
Rogaland 0,78 % 1,27 % 5,36 % 9,19 % 
Hordaland 0,59 % 1,32 % 0,93 % 0,77 % 
Sogn og Fjordane 1,23 % 1,11 % 0,75 % 0,76 % 
Møre og Romsdal 4,10 % 9,44 % 11,50 % 8,82 % 
Sør-Trøndelag 0,83 % 6,35 % 15,75 % 10,23 % 
Nord-Trøndelag 0,19 % 1,86 % 4,97 % 3,29 % 
Nordland 0,78 % 0,64 % 0,84 % 1,07 % 
Troms 0,10 % 0,14 % 0,50 % 1,35 % 
Finnmark 0,05 % 0,11 % 0,39 % 0,75 % 
 
We can see from Table 1-1 that the counties that use the most private providers of 
private day-surgery versus total providers are Oslo, Akershus, Østfold. But by 
looking at the trends, we can se a levelling-out between the counties, especially from 
2004 to 2005. The reason may be the extension of the patient rights act of 1.9.2004, 
which states that the patients can choose other RHEs contracts. This makes it possible 
to produce in one region even if the contracts are in another region. We can also see a 
drastic decline in the percentage of private production versus total production of day-
surgery in Akershus and Oslo from 2002 to 2004. It is possible that the reason for this 
decline is that in these areas the private commercial hospitals have had contracts on 
production since the 1990s and therefore were more lucrative for establishment of 
private commercial hospitals than other regions. We can se that the numbers are 
levelling out gradually when all regions get the possibility for contracts with private 
commercial hospitals.  
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Growth of private commercial hospital production 
Due to the government’s policy on more use of private hospitals (St.meld.nr.5 2003-
2004), we could assume that the use of private hospitals has grown. 
To see if this is a correct assumption the percentage growth each year of number of 
day-surgery treatments in both public and private hospitals were taken. The results 
are presented in figure 1-2, and figure 1-3 
Number of day-surgery treatments in public and 
private hospitals
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Figure 1-2 Number of day-surgery treatments in public and private hospitals 
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Figure 1-3 Percent growth of patients treated in public hospitals and private 
commercial hospitals 
As seen in figure 1-3, the growth of patients treated in private hospitals has increased 
each year much more than the patients treated by public hospitals. The growth is 
present in both private and public sector. The extended use of private hospitals is as 
assumed earlier, and stated in (St.meld.nr.5 2003-2004). 
1.3.3 Topics for research 
In this paper I will look at the private commercial hospitals with day-surgery 
contracts with regional health authorities. I will look at data from the year 2001 to 
present time, but I am to some extent restricted to 2005 due to lack of data. 
The topic “if, and in what extent, privatization and competition within the health care 
service has effected the costs” can be looked upon from different angles. One way of 
enlightening this topic is to see the DRG-cost over time, and compare this with 
institutional behaviour in the same period. 
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The topic “If, and in what extent, privatization and competition has led to selection of 
patients” includes to see if there are differences in the use of private commercial 
hospitals and public hospitals regarding patient age. 
1.4 Theories / Models 
The principal-agent model is one of the models we can use when analyzing 
competition on contracts between hospitals, and between hospitals and regional 
health enterprises. The main point in this model is that we have a principal (in our 
case the regional health enterprise) and an agent (in our case the private hospitals). 
The principal gives orders to the agent who can then choose how to act. The agent 
has some advantages over the principal regarding information, and can use this to 
lower the efficiency or gain other profits. By using a tender, agents will present 
offers, and in a perfect world, show their true costs to the principal. The principal can 
then choose the agent with the lowest costs. In the health care system there can be 
problems regarding cost-comparison between public and private institutions. This is 
because the public hospitals have other tasks as education, research, acute-care etc in 
their production. Due to the admission of patients and acute care, public hospitals 
have a large and extensive equipment-park. This results in large fixed costs. Using 
this equipment to its full extend could lead to less use of the private marked.  
There are several versions of the principal-agent model, but they all have some 
similarities: 
• The model includes some form of contract management; one example 
could be time-restricted contracts. 
• Competition is a primary goal in the principal-agent model; competition 
could be achieved by tender. 
More on the theory and the hypothesis is described in chapter 2. 
 16 
1.5 Material and method 
The data in this thesis are collected from both primary and secondary sources.  
The primary data is collected from the five Regional Health Enterprises and contains 
data on budget processes and costs. This data was gathered by using a questionnaire 
sent to representatives for each of the Regional Health Enterprises asking about the 
costs and budget processes. The contracts between the RHEs and Private commercial 
hospitals were also used as material in this paper and provided by the regional health 
enterprises. 
We are missing data from Health South, but all the other regions have delivered good 
and extensive data. There could be some imperfections in the data as people 
understand questions in a slightly different way.  
The secondary data is gathered from The Norwegian Patient Register (Norsk 
Pasientregister – NPR). NPR gets its data directly from the hospitals who report data 
on patient consultations. The data is relatively extensive controlled nevertheless 
errors in the datasets can occur. 
When comparing hospitals, counties and regions, from the NPR data, there could be 
some differences due to different organization of the services. The dataset only 
contains private actors which are licensed as hospitals. For some patient-groups there 
could be some differences between areas as the patients are treated by private 
specialists and not private hospitals. Some differences could also occur due to 
different registration-practices. 
Which DRGs are being produced at the private hospitals, how the patients are 
distributed regarding age and gender, and the distribution between different parts of 
Norway will be described descriptively. 
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1.5.1 The questionaire 
The questionnaire is based on both qualitative and quantitative questions. The 
quantitative questions consists of a survey of how many contracts the Regional 
Health Enterprises have with private commercial hospitals, as well as the RHEs 
expenditures on these contracts. The qualitative questions are on the topics of budget-
processes and how the contracts are developed, and generally the development of the 
cost and activity. The questions in the questionnaire were both close-ended and open-
ended. 
Open-ended questions 
Open-ended questions have advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the 
respondents can provide own answers and express their opinions in their own words 
(Kumar 2005). 
Close-ended questions 
The close-ended questions have, like the open-ended questions, advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage with these kinds of questions is that the 
investigator gets data which is more easily comparable between different respondents 
(Kumar 2005). 
1.6 Structure of the paper 
I will continue with looking at the theories concerning markets and principal-agent 
models as well as a description of the privatization of the Norwegian health care 
system before I continue with a regression analysis of the data gathered, and 
comments on the results.  
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2. Theory 
2.1 Health care services and competition 
The research questions are: “If, and to what extent, privatization and competition 
within the health care service has effected the costs” and “If, and to what extent, 
privatization and competition has led to selection of patients”. Competition can be 
understood by principal-agent theory where a main point is that in this case the 
private hospitals may take advantage of information to lower efficiency or take out 
profit in different ways. By presenting the private hospitals for competition, going 
from a standard price all hospitals are getting, to a tender, the Regional Health 
Enterprises would under ideal conditions be able to see the private hospitals real 
costs, and make contracts with the hospital with the lowest costs and also prevent 
selection of patients. 
I will in this chapter present the conditions for a private marked as well as the 
theoretical basics of the principal-agent model. At the end of this chapter I will 
present the hypothesis on the basis of the theory presented. 
2.2 Private markeds 
There are several conditions which have to be fulfilled for private production of 
services. The decisive factor for privatization is if it is fit for competition. The 
following conditions have to exist for an effective competition. When all these 
conditions are met, we have what we call a perfect competition:  
• Complete information.  
• Many suppliers and buyers 
• Similar product 
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• Free establishment 
• Small or no costs regarding buying and selling the product 
• Free mobility of workforce and other factors in the production 
• Elasticity in both supply and demand. 
In the real world, no markets fulfil all these conditions completely. Some central 
points on free competition are not fulfilled when looking at the health care system. In 
the health care system there is a lack of information (Stamsø 2005). The patient does 
not know what to request when they are ill. Differences in supply and demand are 
also a problem. Patients have often no qualification to assess their own needs (Stamsø 
2005). And if the decision for treatment-method was handed over to the patient, many 
would choose treatment which not exactly fulfilled the need for the patient. Inelastic 
demand is also an effect regarding health (Stamsø 2005). If the prices for a treatment 
become very large, the demand for the treatment would not decline. Especially if the 
sickness is severe, people would pay the price for the treatment (Stamsø 2005). There 
are also ethical and value issues concerning the marked for health care services, as an 
equal possibility for all to get treatment, regardless of wealth and income.  
Because of this, we are not using the market in its classical form within the health 
care services. Instead we have a public financing, production and control, but 
gradually introducing some market elements and mechanisms. 
The use of market mechanisms in the health services may occur at two levels; 
1. In the relationship between patient and provider 
2. In the relationship between provider and financer (i.e. government or 
insurance-company 
In the Norwegian reforms we can see aims for market mechanisms in both the 
relationship between patient and provider (free hospital choice and 
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“Fastlegeordningen” (patient list system)) and provider and financier (activity based 
financing and enterprise-organizing). 
In this paper I will look at the relationship between provider and financier; between 
Regional Health Authorities and private commercial hospitals. 
2.3 Principal-Agent model  
2.3.1 Literature review 
The foundation for the principal agent model was created on dilemmas of dealing 
with incomplete information within insurance industry contracts (Spence and 
Zeckhauser 1971), but the theory was soon implemented in other dilemmas 
associated with contracting problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Harris and Raviv 
1979). Some practical principal-agent problems which have been theoretically 
presented are “sharecropping”, where contracts are being created between a land 
owner and a farmer (land cultivator). An early work with this is Stiglitz (Stiglitz 
1974). There is also extensive literature for principal-agent models within the 
insurance, and some of the concepts within the model are from the insurance 
literature i.e. “moral hazard”. Sappington (Sappington 1991) provides a discussion of 
principal agent incentive problems. Extensive examples for use of the principal agent 
model could be found in Laffont (Laffont and Martimort 2002; Laffont 2003)  
2.3.2 The Basic Model 
The basic model within the principal-agent theory is that a consumer or a firm, called 
principal, wants to delegate the production of a good to an agent. The output of the 
agent’s production can be described as q(e,q), where q is a function of effort (e) and 
a stochastic element (q),an element of nature; things you can not control. The agent’s 
utility function U(e,w) is a function of effort and wages (w). The principal’s utility 
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function can be described by the function V(q-w) which is the difference between 
production (in monetary terms) and wages paid. 
Principal
V(q-w)
Agent
U(e,w)
Output
q
Payment
w(q)
Output
q(e,q)
 
Figure 2-1 Basic principal agent model 
The principal is positive to output (+) (or production) but negative to wages (-). The 
agent is negative to the effort (-) and positive to wages (+). This is because the 
principal wants high production with low payment, and the agent wants high payment 
with low effort (Rasmusen 1989). 
In the simplest term is asymmetric information a term for when information is 
available to different degrees between the principal and the agent. This could be that 
the principal has problems controlling the agent’s behaviour or effort (Hendrikse 
2003). The classical example of a principal agent problem, and asymmetric 
information, is the relationship between a physician and a patient. Where the 
physician is the agent and treats the patient, which is the principal. The agent has 
more knowledge than the principal; therefore the principal can’t control the situation, 
and must trust the agent’s choices (Hendrikse 2003).  
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Figure 2-2 Asymmetric information 
The moral hazard, or hidden action problem, is also important in the principal agent 
model. Moral hazard is also called hidden action. The main point is that the 
asymmetric information leads to use or exploitation of the information. Because the 
principal can’t control the agent, the agent chooses to do what is preferable for him, 
which often is reducing effort or maximize profit (Hendrikse 2003).  
Agents have different characteristics. While some would take a contract, others will 
reject the same contract. Only agents with certain characteristics will accept the 
contract. This is called adverse selection and is the beginning of the game (Hendrikse 
2003). One way the adverse selection differs from hidden action is that the principal 
can see the agent’s decision, to take or reject the contract. The agent knows the 
motivation for the decisions made while the principal doesn’t know exactly what is 
guiding the agent (Hendrikse 2003).  
2.3.3 Model and Hypothesis 
The principal-agent model is presented in figure 2-3. The Adverse selection happens 
in the level on top, where an agent chooses to accept or reject a contract. The next 
level is where the moral hazard can occur. The agent chooses high or low effort. The 
next step is a stochastic element, the things you can’t control, which leads to a good 
or a bad result. 
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Figure 2-3 Principal-agent model with moral hazard 
Hypothesis 
When introducing competition on day-surgery treatment, we could assume that the 
costs are reduced. The principal’s contract with an agent is the subject for 
competition, and agents have to accept contracts with lower payments or profits. The 
problem with moral hazard in this game is low as the principal has a time restricted 
contract with the agents, and could choose to not renew the contract or choose 
another agent after the time-period. The possibility for reduction of quality is also 
low as the contracts are frequently renewed. Therefore we could say that the quality 
is not reduced, and the agent will perform with high effort, this also because the 
payments are activity based.  
When going from predetermined DRG-costs, like the one given to the public 
hospitals, to a tender on DRG-costs, we could assume a reduction in costs. This is 
because the predetermined DRG-costs are based on the costs of public hospitals 
where a lot of other costs also are included like; emergency care, ambulatory care and 
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education. When using the predetermined DRG-cost we could assume high 
profitability, or low efficiency by the private commercial hospitals. 
When introducing competition, we could also assume a shift in the type of patients 
treated. In order to compensate for the lower payments, the agents choose healthier 
and less complicated patients. Since it may be harmful for the agent to reduce the 
quality of the services because they may loose the contract in the next period, the 
agent wants the easy patients and “easy money”. Often are younger patients healthier 
and easier to treat than older patients, therefore we could assume that the private 
providers treat younger patients than the public providers. We can divide the 
problems with selection into three main groups, creaming, skimping and dumping. 
Creaming is referring to an over-provision of services provided to low-cost patients, 
skimping is referring to under-provision of services to high cost patients and dumping 
is referring to not treating high cost patients or patient groups (Ellis 1998). 
The main hypothesis will be as follows: 
• Due to the privatization and competition on day-surgery we could assume 
that the prices pr DRG have been reduced over the years.  
• Due to competition which leads to cost reduction and again to selection of 
patients, private commercial hospitals treat younger patients than public 
hospitals in day-surgery. They choose low risk patients over high risk 
patients (creaming).  
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3. Descriptive Statistics  
In this chapter I will present the data collected on; contracts, activity, DRG costs, and 
see if there are some trends concerning primarily costs and selection. I will also 
briefly address some descriptive elements of the data gathered. 
3.1 Number of contracts 
The Regional health authorities make contracts with private commercial hospitals for 
delivering day-surgery treatments. The numbers of contracts each year for the 
different regional health authorities are presented in Figure 3-1 
Number of contracts
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Health East 4 4 7 10 10 10 7
Health South 4 6 3 3 3 3
Health West 0 3 4 3 3 4 4
Health Middle-Norway 0 4 5 6 4 4 3
Health North 0 0 3 4 3 3 3
1.1.2002 1.7.2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Figure 3-1(the numbers for Health South are collected from Health South’s 
Yearly reports, all other numbers are from the questionnaire) 
It is clear that Region Health East has the highest number of contracts. Reasons for 
this may be that there are many private commercial hospitals in the Health East area, 
as a result they are using this capacity to deliver day-surgery. We can see more easily 
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in figure 3-2 that we have a peak in 2004 with a total of 26 contracts, reduced to a 20 
contracts in 2007.  
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Figure 3-2 Number of contracts, sum all regions 
3.2 Which DRG-groups are treated at private commercial 
hospitals? 
The DRG-groups produced as day surgery by private commercial hospitals include 
almost every day-surgery DRG. There are about 39 DRG-groups which are not 
represented (-) by the private commercial hospitals of day-surgery in the year 2002 to 
2005, these are represented in table 3-1. This is about 24% of the total numbers of 
DRG-groups represented in the dataset of day-surgery (total number of DRG-groups 
are 165 in this case). The DRG-coding-list of day-surgery treatments can be found in 
the appendix.  
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DRG Priv Publ DRG Priv Publ DRG Priv Publ DRG Priv Publ 
  4 + + 156 - + 228 + + 338 + + 
  6 + + 157 + + 229 + + 339 + + 
  7 + + 158 + + 230 + + 340 + + 
  8 + + 159 + + 231 + + 341 + + 
 36 + + 160 + + 232 + + 342 + + 
 37 - + 161 + + 233 + + 343 + + 
 38 + + 162 + + 234 + + 345 + + 
 39 + + 163 + + 257 + + 354 - + 
 40 + + 166 - + 258 + + 355 + + 
 41 + + 166N - + 259 + + 356 + + 
 42 + + 167 - + 260 + + 357 - + 
 50 + + 168 - + 261 + + 358 + + 
 51 + + 169 + + 262 + + 359 + + 
 52 + + 170 + + 265 + + 360 + + 
 53 + + 171 + + 266 + + 361 + + 
 54 + + 193 - + 267 + + 363 + + 
 55 + + 194 + + 268 + + 364 + + 
 55A + + 195 + + 269 + + 365 + + 
 55B - + 196 - + 270 + + 377 - + 
 56 + + 210 + + 286 - + 381 + + 
 57 + + 211 + + 288 + + 392 - + 
 58 + + 212 + + 288A + + 394 + + 
 59 + + 213 + + 288B + + 401 - + 
 60 + + 214 + + 291 - + 402 - + 
 61 + + 214B + + 292 - + 408 + + 
 62 + + 214C + + 293 + + 415 + + 
 63 + + 215 + + 303 - + 424 + + 
 76 - + 215B + + 304 - + 424N + + 
 77 + + 215C + + 305 - + 439 - + 
112 + + 216 + + 306 - + 441 + + 
114 - + 217 + + 307 + + 442 + + 
116 - + 218 + + 308 + + 443 + + 
117 - + 219 + + 309 + + 458 - + 
118 - + 220 + + 310 - + 459 - + 
119 + + 221 + + 311 + + 461 + + 
152 - + 222 + + 312 - + 493 + + 
153 + + 223 + + 313 + + 494 + + 
154 + + 224 + + 314 + + 501A + + 
154B - + 225 + + 315 - + 501B + + 
155 + + 226 + + 336 - + 502 - + 
155B + + 227 + + 337 - + 509 + + 
                521 + + 
 
Table 3-1 DRGs treated in the year 2002-2005 in Day-surgery. Represented:”+” , 
Not represented:”-“ 
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This means that of the total amount of available DRG-groups, the private are 
qualified or able to perform about ¾ of the DRG-groups. 
The 10 largest DRG-groups for private commercial hospitals in the year 2002 to 2005 
are presented in table 3-2 
Table 3-2 DRGs treated most commonly by commercial hospitals. Total 
2002-2005 
DRG Private Public Total 
222 17916 60369 78285
112 8931 34471 43402
224 7464 30637 38101
270 6056 34515 40571
261 5091 6733 11824
 39 3878 102109 105987
119 3704 26448 30152
 36 3033 26206 29239
225 3028 21449 24477
 40 2795 34423 37218
227 2772 22997 25769
 
We can see that group 222 (Knee procedures w/o cc) is the definitively largest group 
for private hospitals.  
Table 3-3 Percent private production of DRG-group of total production 
2002-2005 
DRG Private Public Total Percent 
288B 2029 892 2921 69,46 %
288 717 510 1227 58,44 %
261 5091 6733 11824 43,06 %
343 1765 3439 5204 33,92 %
222 17916 60369 78285 22,89 %
268 1811 6852 8663 20,90 %
112 8931 34471 43402 20,58 %
224 7464 30637 38101 19,59 %
443 488 2141 2629 18,56 %
 56 2412 10624 13036 18,50 %
 
Table 3-3 shows that some DRG-groups are used more of private than public 
hospitals. The DRGs which have a higher private treatment than public treatment are 
the DRGs 288B and 288, operations for adiposities.  
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3.3 Contracts 
3.3.1 Budget processes 
We can divide the different process types into four groups: 
• Cost Comparison (C): Budget is based on comparison of costs with 
different actors, public or private, without selective contracts 
• Tender (T): Budget based on cost comparison with other actors, with 
selective contracts 
• Negotiations between private and regional health authorities (N) 
• No cost comparison was done, (fixed prices) (0 cases)  
Budget processes 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
Health East * T T * T T 
Health South * * * * * * 
Health West * N N T T T 
Health Middle-
Norway * C C C T C 
Health North * * T T T T 
Table 3-4 Budget processes          * Not available 
 
We can see that tender is more and more used, and has become the most used form 
for budget processes. Within this group, the RHAs emphasize that not only price, but 
quality and accessibility were a criteria for which private hospitals got the contract. 
Some regions are also mentioning that they have had some problems concerning 
tender in their region. The reason for this is that the private hospitals often have only 
one contract with one regional health enterprise, and the result of who gets the 
contract could be dependent for the hospitals existing or non-existing. The marked 
situation is therefore not balanced, which is a condition for having a tender with one 
winner. 
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Health East comments that in the beginning, the ABF-refund was extremely guiding 
for how the private hospitals were pricing their services, as they calculated this part 
as “free” for the regional health enterprise. Gradually this has reduced in importance 
as the private hospitals figured out that they competed directly with each other on 
price, and that the RHE didn’t look at the ABF-refund as part of the offers. Health 
region East is in the opinion that prices have been dropping, and now reflects a more 
correct picture of the cost of treating the patients.  
Health East are also emphasising that the last couple of years there has been a focus 
on patient rights and treatment-guarantees. This has also affected the private 
hospitals, which also have to do right prioritizing, handling of waiting lists, and 
treatment of patients to avoid guarantee violation.  
Contracts 
There are different ways of creating a contract; we can separate the contracts into four 
different groups: 
1. No cap on budget size and activity (alt. 1.) 
2. Cap on budget size, but not on activity (alt. 2.) 
3. No cap on budget size, cap on activity (alt. 3) 
4. Cap on both budget size and activity (alt. 4) 
Contracts 2001 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
Health East * 1 3 3 3 3 
Health South * * * * * * 
Health West 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Health Middle-Norway * 1 1 1 4 4 
Health North * * 2 2 2 2 
Table 3-5 Contract types          *Not available 
   
We can see from table 3-5 that in 2002 the regions had mostly no cap on budget size 
and activity. This changes in 2003 when Health East puts a cap on the activity for the 
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private hospitals, and Health North puts a cap on the budget sizes. Health South is 
keeping no cap on budget size or activity all the way through 2005 but starts in 2006 
to have a cap on activity.  
3.4 Price 
Data on the prices are collected from the contracts between the regional health 
enterprises and the private hospitals. The data presented in figure 3-3 is the un-
weighted mean percentage refund of all DRGs combined included in contracts for 
each region. 
0,00 %
10,00 %
20,00 %
30,00 %
40,00 %
50,00 %
60,00 %
70,00 %
80,00 %
90,00 %
Health Midle-Norway 76,25 % 76,40 % 70,00 % 48,75 % 48,75 % 56,50 % 56,50 %
Health East 80,00 % 60,00 % 60,00 % 40,00 % 40,00 %
Health West 76,67 % 67,50 % 56,50 % 56,50 %
Health North 74,00 % 75,00 % 55,67 % 55,67 % 55,67 %
Mean 76,73 % 67,97 % 65,38 % 50,23 % 48,14 % 56,08 % 56,50 %
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
Figure 3-3 Mean percentage refund pr DRG-point for private hospitals. 
*Health South is missing data 
We can see that the mean price weight pr DRG has been reduced from 2002 to 2006, 
(for 2007 and 2008 the numbers are predicted from the regional health authorities.) 
What the reduction in practice means, is that the cost pr DRG is being reduced. This 
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results in cheaper treatments for the regional health authorities. Some regions are in 
fact “earning” money on the use of some private providers, as the payment per 
treatment is lower than the refund the regional health authorities are receiving. The 
evolvement in monetary terms for each year is shown in figure 3-4. 
Mean NOK pr DRG
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Mean NOK pr DRG 22580 15257 19613 15232 14598
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Figure 3-4 Mean NOK pr DRG-point 
Here we can see that the mean price pr DRG provided by private hospitals in 2002 
was 22580 NOK, this is reduced to 14598 NOK in 2006, a reduction on about 35%. 
The prices presented in figure 3-4 are actual prices for each year. 
The principal-agent theory states that if you introduce competition the principal 
would see the real costs, and act accordingly. We can see that the prices were 
relatively high in 2002 and gradually reducing through the years up to 2006. Chapter 
4 contains an analysis to see if this reduction in costs really is the case. 
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4. Cost effects 
Hypothesis: Due to the privatization and competition on day-surgery we could 
assume that the prices pr DRG have been reduced over the years. 
4.1 Empirical model 
Referring to the principal-agent model we could say that the costs pr patient (Cost) 
the regional health enterprises have to pay is dependent on which type of process 
(Pro) is being used (table 3-4). The weighting (WEIGHT) of the DRGs treated may 
be a measure of how complex and resource-demanding the treatments are. 
Differences in regions (RHE) can be a factor as well as which year (YEAR) the 
treatments were given, both regions and years treated as dummy-variables. A 
regression equation could be like this: 
Cost = b0 + b1*Pro + b2*WEIGHT+ b3*RHE + b4*YEAR 
The independent variables RHE and YEAR are being translated into the independent 
variables; EAST, WEST, MIDDLE and d2003, d2004, d2005 as dummy variables. 
Region South is filtered out as the data is missing for this region. NORTH and d2002 
are being used as reference categories.   
From the datasets from the Norwegian patient register combined with the answers 
from the questionnaire we get these descriptive statistics: 
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Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Cost 81479 40 80 58,87 12,80 
Pro 87825 0 3 1,39 0,85 
WEIGHT 101414 0,17 5,26 0,80 0,42 
RHE 101414 0 6 2,09 1,28 
Y 101414 2002 2005 2003,8 1,00 
EAST 101404 0 1 0,49 0,50 
SOUTH 101404 0 1 0,20 0,40 
WEST 101404 0 1 0,07 0,26 
MIDDLE 101404 0 1 0,22 0,42 
NORTH 101404 0 1 0,02 0,14 
d2002 101414 0 1 0,11 0,31 
d2003 101414 0 1 0,23 0,42 
d2004 101414 0 1 0,31 0,46 
d2005 101414 0 1 0,34 0,48 
Valid N (listwise) 67900         
Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics for the Cost analysis 
 
When the linear regressions later in this paper are being used, the region SOUTH is 
filtered out as we are missing data on Cost and Processes on this region. 
4.2 Empirical results 
Linear regression 
The linear regression analysis examines the relation of a dependent variable to 
different independent variables. The linear regression analysis estimates the 
coefficients of a linear equation that best predicts the value of the dependent variable. 
To do a linear regression the assumption has to be made that for each value of the 
independent variable, the distribution of the dependent variable must be normal. 
Output 
The analysis consists of data from 2002 to 2005 and includes only day-surgical 
procedures produced by private commercial hospitals. The model is estimated via 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and the results are reported in table 4-2. 
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Variables B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 112,370 0,118 0,000 
Pro -8,574 0,044 0,000 
WEIGHT -0,024 0,025 0,348 
EAST -16,736 0,065 0,000 
WEST -5,429 0,070 0,000 
MIDDLE -9,098 0,069 0,000 
D2003 -18,333 0,036 0,000 
D2004 -26,053 0,048 0,000 
D2005 -37,831 0,034 0,000 
Adjusted R Square 0,963     
Table 4-2 Regression, Dependent variable: Cost, Independent variables: 
Pro, WEIGHT, EAST, WEST, MIDDLE, d2003, d2004, d2005. Reference 
dummy variable: NORTH, d2002 
The “Adjusted R-square” in table 4-2 tells us that 96,3% of the variance in the 
dependent variable (Cost) is explained by variations in the independent variables. 
The table 4-2 provides information on the effect of the individual variables (the 
column “B”) on the dependent variable and the confidence with which we can 
support the estimate for each value (“Sig.”). The column “B” shows the values for the 
regression equation for predicting the dependent variable from the independent 
variables. The regression equation is: 
Cost = b0 + b1*Pro + b2*WEIGHT + b3*EAST + b4*WEST + b5*MIDDLE + 
b6*d2003 + b7*d2004 + b8*d2005 
Each value in the column “B” are effects on the cost within the specific region and 
within the specific years. Each of the regression coefficients are representing the 
amount the dependent variable (cost) changes when the corresponding independent 
variable changes 1 unit.  
Since the significance level for weight is 0,348 and much higher than 0,05 we can 
exclude this from the equation, as it is not significant. We could say that the 
weighting of the different DRGs are not playing a significant role regarding the 
increase or decline of costs pr DRG-point.  
The processes (pro) being used are responsible for a reduction of 8,574 percent points 
on the costs. This implies that the introduction of competition and tender on contracts 
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have reduced the costs for the regional health enterprises for private day-surgery 
treatments. 
We can see in this regression that the years (dummies) has the highest impact on the 
costs, with an 18,33, 26,05 and 37,83 percent point reduction from the year 2002 to 
2003, 2004 and 2005. This indicates that there also are effects between the years, 
other than the processes (pro) that are explaining the costs.  
When not taking years into account, the regression will be like this: 
 B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
(Constant) 97,178 0,438 0,000
Pro -17,928 0,157 0,000
WEIGHT 1,932 0,116 0,000
EAST -7,642 0,292 0,000
WEST -1,743 0,321 0,000
MIDDLE -10,791 0,314 0,000
Adjusted R Square 0,229   
Table 4-3 Regression, Dependent variable: Cost, Independent variables: 
Pro, WEIGHT, EAST, WEST, MIDDLE 
The table 4-3 shows that all of the variables chosen are significant. The processes 
(Pro) have the highest effect (-17,928) on the costs. Therefore we can conclude that 
the processes used have reduced the costs. The weight contributes to a 1,932 percent-
point rise of the costs, which can be interpreted as when the DRG-weight of the day-
surgery is rising by one unit, the costs will rise by 1,932 percent points. A drawback 
in this analysis is that only 22,9% of the variance in the dependent variable (Cost) 
was explained by variations in the independent variables. 
When comparing the two regressions for costs we can see that processes (Pro) are 
most important when looking at the model in table 4-3, while the years (d2003, 
d2004, d2005) are more important in the model in table 4-2. The reason for the lower 
process-effect and higher effects of years in table 4-2 may be that there are other 
effects concerning how the price (Cost) is set in the private commercial hospitals 
contracts. When the regional health enterprises started buying services from the 
private commercial hospitals in 2002 they could not see which prices were “right”, 
they didn’t have enough information to set correct prices. Each year the regional 
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health enterprise got more information about the costs of the private hospital, and 
could therefore set the prices more correctly and as a result reduced the DRG refund 
year by year. It is clear to me that the first years of private commercial day-surgery 
were highly profitable for the private hospitals. 
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5. Selection 
Hypothesis: Due to competition which leads to cost reduction and again to selection 
of patients, private commercial hospitals treat younger patients than public hospitals 
in day-surgery. 
5.1 Have privatization and competition led to selection of 
patients? 
The hypothesis is that private hospitals treat younger patients than public hospitals. 
Because a young patient generally is healthier than an older, and that the risks for 
complications generally are lower for a younger patient, private hospitals will 
“choose” younger patients. 
Theoretically this could be seen as a moral hazard problem, where the private hospital 
chooses high or low effort see figure 2-3. Since younger patients often are less 
complicated or need lower effort to treat, they will be chosen by the private hospitals. 
To test this hypothesis the mean age of patients is taken on both public and private 
commercial hospitals. The results are presented in figure 5-1. 
 39
Mean age
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Figure 5-1 Mean age, patients treated by private and public hospitals 
We can see from figure 5-1 that the private hospitals in fact are treating younger 
patients than the public hospitals except the year 2002. We can see that the mean age 
levels out between private and public hospitals. From this we could say that the 
selection of patients on the topic of age is reduced from 2003 to 2005. 
To test the hypothesis that the private hospitals treat younger patients than public 
hospitals more thoroughly, I used linear regression (OLS regression) with the data 
separated for each year. The descriptive data for this analysis is presented in table 5-
1. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
y 1277836 2002 2005
2003,59
7 1,097 
WEIGHT 1277836 0,17 5,26 0,873 0,655 
EAST 1275026 0 1 0,310 0,462 
SOUTH 1275026 0 1 0,243 0,429 
WEST 1275026 0 1 0,190 0,392 
MIDDLE 1275026 0 1 0,150 0,357 
NORTH 1275026 0 1 0,108 0,310 
PRIV 1277836 1 2 1,921 0,270 
Valid N 
(listwise) 1275026     
Table 5-1 Descriptive data for the AGE analysis 
East, West, Middle and South are dummy variables with North as reference. The 
results of the regressions are presented in table 5-2.The regression equation for this 
analysis is:  
AGEyear = b0 + b1* WEIGHT + b2*SOUTH + b3*EAST + b4*WEST + b5*MIDDLE 
+ b6*PRIV 
 Dependent Variable : AGE 
  2002 2003 
  B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 41,104 0,480 0,00 36,096 0,333 0,00 
WEIGHT 6,572 0,086 0,00 7,103 0,060 0,00 
EAST 1,624 0,155 0,00 2,790 0,141 0,00 
WEST 1,395 0,167 0,00 2,162 0,152 0,00 
MIDDLE 2,657 0,177 0,00 2,773 0,159 0,00 
SOUTH 2,933 0,158 0,00 3,392 0,144 0,00 
PRIV -0,181 0,227 0,43 2,389 0,154 0,00 
       
 Dependent Variable : AGE 
 2004 2005 
  B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 39,438 0,296 0,00 41,227 0,279 0,00 
WEIGHT 5,643 0,053 0,00 7,958 0,058 0,00 
EAST 2,353 0,139 0,00 2,398 0,137 0,00 
WEST 1,119 0,148 0,00 1,486 0,145 0,00 
MIDDLE 2,001 0,155 0,00 2,203 0,153 0,00 
SOUTH 1,923 0,144 0,00 1,355 0,142 0,00 
PRIV 1,642 0,135 0,00 -0,111 0,127 0,38 
Table 5-2 Regression, Dependent variable: Age, Independent variables: 
WEIGHT, EAST, WEST, MIDDLE, SOUTH, PRIV. Reference dummy 
variable: NORTH. Separate regressions each for each year. 
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The regression results show that the differences in age of patients in 2002 and 2005 
between private and public providers of day-surgery are not significant. As shown in 
the table 5-3, the years 2003 and 2004 have a significant difference between private 
and public hospitals on patient’s age. 
 PRIV  
 B Sig.  
2002 -0,181 0,43 Not Significant 
2003 2,389 0,00 Significant 
2004 1,642 0,00 Significant 
2005 -0,111 0,38 Not Significant 
Table 5-3 Significance of Private hospitals on AGE 
This difference indicates that in the years 2003 and 2004 there have been some kind 
of selection of patients by the private hospitals. They are treating patients which are 
2,38 and 1,64 years younger than the patients treated by public hospitals. Based on 
these findings it is difficult to make a certain conclusion about the selection of 
patients.  
When not taking years into account, the regression results are as presented in table 5-
4. 
Variables  B 
Std. 
Error Sig 
(Constant) 39,569 ,162 ,000
WEIGHT 6,814 ,031 ,000
EAST 2,332 ,071 ,000
WEST 1,572 ,076 ,000
MIDDLE 2,390 ,080 ,000
SOUTH 2,369 ,073 ,000
PRIV ,900 ,075 ,000
Table 5-4 Regression, Dependent variable: Age, Independent variables: 
WEIGHT, EAST, WEST, MIDDLE, SOUTH, PRIV. Reference dummy 
variable: NORTH. All years as a whole  
 
Overall in the period the difference between private and public hospitals are 
significant and not due to chance. The overall difference between public and private 
hospitals is 0.9 years. This confirms the hypothesis that private hospitals are treating 
younger patients than public hospitals, but it is with a lot of uncertainty due to the 
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findings in table 5-2 and table 5-3, where we can find years with not significant 
differences between private and public providers.  
A possible explanation for the non significant age-difference in 2002 could be that 
the price the private commercial hospitals got in 2002, was high, hence no selection 
of patients were necessary to earn money. In 2005 the non significant difference in 
age could be an effect of the private commercial hospitals anxiety to loose their 
contracts the next period.  
Other selection problems? 
Other selection problems could be selection of DRG-groups, which DRG-groups are 
treated more or less. This is hard to asses as the total use of private commercial 
hospitals had an enormous boom and the contracts between the regional health 
enterprises and the private commercial hospitals have not been constant in the period.  
However, in the questionnaire the Health Region East states that they can not see any 
effects of a selection of patients by the private commercial hospitals as the production 
is guided by production-frames within the different areas. They also emphasize that 
the private commercial hospitals can only treat patients when the patients are sent 
from a referring authority. It is therefore the referring authority combined with the 
patient choice which decides how many patients the private commercial hospitals are 
treating. All regions also state in the questionnaire that they can not see any cases or 
indications of selection of patients by the private commercial hospitals.  
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6. Conclusions  
6.1 The use of private hospitals 
The topic of this paper has been the effects the private commercial hospitals have on 
cost and patient selection within day surgery treatments. The hypotheses tested were: 
• Due to the privatization and competition on day-surgery we could assume 
that the prices pr DRG have been reduced over the years.  
• Due to competition which leads to cost reduction and again to selection of 
patients, private commercial hospitals treat younger patients than public 
hospitals in day-surgery. They choose low risk patients over high risk 
patients (creaming).  
The data shows us that the use of private hospitals have grown the last couple of 
years, and the mean cost pr produced DRG-point has been reduced. The effect will 
hypothetically be higher production and lower costs. One should be aware of that this 
could lead to a lower quality of services provided. This because there is a limit on 
how much one can push the price before some areas in the treatments gets affected. 
The regional health enterprises are clear on their answers in the questionnaire that 
they in addition to price also look at quality when assessing whether a private 
hospital should get a contract or not, hopefully enough to prevent a recession in 
quality. 
If the privatization of day-surgery treatments really have had a cost reducing effect on 
the entire health care system, is difficult to say. But it is clear that the day surgical 
treatments performed by private commercial hospitals have become cheaper for the 
regional health enterprises over the years. One could imagine that the public hospitals 
are loosing patients to the private commercial hospitals and therefore are loosing 
money on easily treated patients. The public hospitals may also get vacant capacity 
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which could lead to higher total costs. If the cost reductions by privatizing day 
surgery treatments are higher than the possible cost increase for public hospitals and 
the health care sector as a whole, is hard to say.  
The data presented in this thesis show that in the year 2005 the mean refund pr DRG-
point for private commercial hospitals was 50,25% while the refund from the 
government to the regional health enterprises was 60% pr DRG-point. In other words, 
the regional health enterprises earned money when they used the private commercial 
hospitals to perform day-surgery treatments that year. The money earned could be 
distributed among the other public hospitals. 
We could say that the privatization and competition has worked the way it intended. 
The principal-agent theory states that if you introduce competition the principal 
would see the real costs, and act accordingly. We can see that the prices were 
relatively high in 2002 and gradually declining through the years to 2006. The cost 
analysis confirms this, and the processes as well as the difference between the defined 
years are significant regarding a cost reduction. 
The patients using private hospitals for day-surgery are now more than ever more 
equal the users of public day-surgery-providers when looking at distribution of age. 
The age analysis shows a significant difference in age for the years 2003-2004, but no 
significant difference in the years 2002 and 2005. The reason for no selection in 2002 
is possibly the high level of payment for each patient resulted in high profits for all 
patients. In 2005 the cause is more vague, the reason may to some extend be the 
patient right act and its extension in 2004 as well as an anxiety from the private 
commercial hospitals to not getting their contracts renewed the next period. 
The data used in the analysis are restricted to the years 2002-2005, but some of the 
descriptive data includes the years 2006 and estimates for 2007 and 2008. We are 
missing data on Health South in the cost analysis which could lead to some 
differences in the results but probably not change the overall conclusion of the cost 
analysis.  
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6.2 Supply of health care services 
Within the health care system it is the provider, by the doctor and health personnel 
which have the most information regarding the patient’s needs and treatments. This 
gives the provider a great deal of power in a market. Due to the asymmetric 
information the health personnel can choose the services a patient should get. Primary 
doctors are therefore often called “gatekeepers” because they decide who gets 
treatment in for example a hospital. In the health care sector there are large 
establishment costs, both regarding equipment and education and specialization of 
personnel. Therefore there are relatively few competitors to establish new institutions.  
Since supply of health services generates demand for health services, we can say that 
if someone supplies a health service we would get demand for it. If a new treatment 
method is entering a market, there would be demand for this method. The medical-
technological evolvement creates often new products and treatment-methods.  
6.2.1 Pros and Cons with private health services 
There are both positive and negative aspects for private and public supply of health 
care services. Arguments for private health care services in Norway is often presented 
as; the relieve-argument, necessity-argument, freedom of choice-argument, and the 
historical-argument (Hjort 1987).  
Relieve-argument 
The relieve-argument says that a supply from a private health care sector, contributes 
to raise the total supply of health care services, and by relieving the public health care 
services, reducing patient queues and waiting-time (Hjort 1987).  
Necessity-argument 
The necessity-argument states that the public health care system not always have the 
resources (financial) to supply health care services due to rapidly growing demand 
(Hjort 1987). 
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Competition-argument 
The competition-argument includes that private providers of health care services have 
economic reward systems which makes them more efficient and consumer- and 
service-oriented. They are interested in a profit, and have therefore more to gain with 
efficient production and satisfied patients (Hjort 1987). 
Freedom of Choice-argument 
The freedom of choice-argument states that it is a human right to spend money on the 
treatment they want, and choose where they want to be treated (Hjort 1987). 
Historical-argument 
The historical-argument refers to that we in all times have been provided by some 
private health care services and free “industry “in Norway (Hjort 1987). 
There are of course some negative aspects of private health care services as well. A 
main disadvantage of private health care services is that there could be a problem to 
fulfil political goals and priorities, especially the idea of equal access to health care 
services regardless of private financial resources and geographical locations.  
6.3 Epilogue 
The rising prosperity has created an increasing demand for health services and such a 
market for private, commercial health-services. Increased wealth in the population, 
greater possibilities of choice, queues and budget-problems in the public health 
services and an increasing growth of health-personnel, is factors which can explain 
this trend. These private suppliers are naturally constrained to larger or medium-sized 
cities, but are used increasingly by inhabitants from the entire country. This trend is 
reinforced by “Rikstrygdeverkets” and the Regional health enterprises purchasing of 
services in this marked. In some areas the competition between private and public 
providers of health-services is noticeable. The economical, ideological and political 
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development will decide if commercialised health services are to be more than a 
valuable supplement to the public offering of health-services. 
We have to assume that the private commercial supply of health-services has come to 
stay, and in a population with a growing wealth in the middleclass, possibly grow. At 
the same time we can see that the private-health supply primarily will concentrate on 
different niches in the health market, often tied to specific diagnosis and problems 
(Øvretveit 2003). Within these areas the private supply could lead to effective and 
good solutions which again could lead to more awareness amongst the public 
hospitals. More complicated interventions and patients with chronic and intricate 
problems, will still be treated within the public healthcare. As will the responsibility 
for acute care, research, education, training and cooperation between different parts 
of the health service. The growth of private supply may therefore result in 
distribution-effects with consequences for other patient-groups and other health-
services.  
How big, and what role, the private commercial health-service will have in Norway, 
is guided by the restructuring and adaptation skills in the public health-services and 
on the size of the budget-constraints at their disposal. The main issue is effectiveness 
and policy. But the preferences to liquid and consumer-oriented patients will 
probably also play an increasing role (Berg 2006). 
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Appendix 1 DRG-Codes for day-surgery 
DRG Type of treatment 
004 Spinal procedures 
006 Carpal tunnel release 
007 Periph & cranial nerve & other nerv sys proc w cc 
008 Periph & cranial nerve & other nerv sys proc w/o cc 
009 Spinal disorders & injuries 
036 Retinal procedures 
037 Orbital procedures 
038 Primary iris procedures 
039 Lens procedures with or without vitrectomy 
040 Extraocular procedures except orbit age > 17 
041 Extraocular procedures except orbit age 0-17 
042 Intraocular procedures except retina iris & lens 
050 Sialoadenectomy 
051 Salivary gland procedures except sialoadenectomy 
052 Cleft lip & palate repair 
053A Sinus procedures 
053B Mastoid, temporal bone and inner ear procedures 
054O Sinus procedure, short therapy 
054P Mastoid, temporal bone and inner ear procedures, short therapy 
055O Miscellaneous major ear, nose , mouth & throat procedures, short therapy 
055P Other minor ear, nose , mouth & throat procedures, short therapy 
055 Miscellaneous ear, nose , mouth & throat procedures 
056 Rhinoplasty 
057 T&a proc, except tonsillectomy &/or adenoidectomy only, age > 17 
058 T&a proc, except tonsillectomy &/or adenoidectomy only, age 0-17 
059 Tonsillectomy &/or adenoidectomy only, age >17 
060O Operations on tonsils or adenois, short therapy 
060 Tonsillectomy &/or adenoidectomy only, age 0-17 
063O Other major ear, nose, mouth & throat o. r. procedures, short therapy 
063 Other major ear, nose, mouth & throat o. r. procedures 
076 Other resp system o. r. procedures w cc 
077O Other resp system o. r. procedures, short therapy 
077 Other resp system o. r. procedures w/o cc 
112A Coronary dilatation with contrast cardiography 
112B Percutaneuous ablations for cardiac arrhytmia 
112C PCI w/o myocardial infarction, w/o CC 
112D PCI w/o myocardial infarction, w CC 
112E PCI w myocardial infarction, w/o CC 
112F PCI w myocardial infarction, w CC 
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112O Percutaneous cardiovascular procedures, short therapy 
114 Upper limb & toe amputation for circulatory system disorder 
119O Vein ligation & stripping, short therapy 
119 Vein ligation & stripping 
152 Small & large bowel procedures w cc 
153 Small & large bowel procedures w/o cc 
154A Major stomach, esophageal and duodenal procedures, age >17, w cc 
154B Other stomach, esophageal and duodenal procedures, age > 17, w cc 
155A Major stomach, esophageal and duodenal procedures, age >17, w/o cc 
155B Other stomach, esophageal and duodenal procedures, age >17, w/o cc 
156O Stomach, esophageal & duodenal procedures, short therapy 
156 Stomach, esophageal & duodenal procedures, age 0-17 
157 Minor intestinal procedure w cc 
158O Minor intestinal procedures, short therapy 
158 Minor intestinal procedures w/o cc 
159 Hernia procedures except inguinal & femoral, age > 17 w cc 
160O Hernia procedures except inguinal & femoral, short therapy 
160 Hernia procedures except inguinal & femoral, age > 17 w/o cc 
161 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures, age > 17 w cc 
162O Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures, short therapy 
162 Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures, age > 17 w/o cc 
163 Hernia procedures, age 0-17 
166N Appendectomy w complicated principal diag 
167O Appendectomy, short therapy 
167 Appendectomy w/o complicated principal diag w/o cc 
168 Mouth procedures w cc 
169O Mouth procedures, short therapy 
169 Mouth procedures w/o cc 
170 Other digestive system o. r. procedures w cc 
171O Other digestive system o. r. procedures, short therapy 
171 Other digestive system o. r. procedures w/o cc 
193 Biliary tract proc except only cholecys w or w/o c. d. e. w cc 
194 Biliary tract proc except only cholecys w or w/o c. d. e. w/o cc 
195 Cholecystectomy w c. d. e. w cc 
196 Cholecystectomy w c. d. e. w/o cc 
210 Hip & femur procedures except major joint, age > 17, w cc 
211 Hip & femur procedures except major joint, age > 17, w/o cc 
212O Hip & femur procedures except major joint, short therapy 
212 Hip & femur procedures except major joint, age 0-17 
213O Amputation for musculoskeletal system & conn tissue disorder, short therapy 
213 Amputation for musculoskeletal system & conn tissue disorder 
214A Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion 
214B Spinal fusion with cc 
214C Back & neck procedures except spinal fusion, w cc 
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215B Anterior or posterior spinal fusion, w/o cc 
215C Back & neck procedures except spinal fusion,  w/o cc 
215O Back & neck procedures, short therapy 
216O Biopsies of musculosceletal system & connective tissue, short therapy 
216 Biopsies of musculosceletal system & connective tissue 
217O Wnd debrid & skn grft except hand, for muscscelet & conn tissue disease, short therapy 
217 Wnd debrid & skn grft except hand, for muscscelet & conn tissue disease 
218 Lower extrem & humer proc except hip, foot, femur age > 17, with cc 
219 Lower extrem & humer proc except hip, foot, femur age > 17, w/o cc 
220O Lower extrem & humer proc except hip, foot, femur, short therapy 
220 Lower extrem & humer proc except hip, foot, femur age 0-17 
221 Knee procedures w cc 
222O Knee procedures, short therapy 
222 Knee procedures w/o cc 
223O Major shoulder/elbow proc, or other upper extremity proc, short therapy 
223 Major shoulder/elbow proc, or other upper extremity proc w cc 
224O Shoulder, elbow or forearm proc, exc major joint proc, short therapy 
224 Shoulder, elbow or forearm proc, exc major joint proc, w/o cc 
225O Foot procedures, short therapy 
225 Foot procedures 
226 Soft tissue procedures w cc 
227O Soft tissue procedures, short therapy 
227 Soft tissue procedures w/o cc 
228O Major thumb or joint proc, or other hand or wrist procedures, short therapy 
228 Major thumb or joint proc, or oth hand or wrist proc w cc 
229O Hand or wrist procedures, except major joint procedures, short therapy 
229 Hand or wrist proc, except major joint proc, w/o cc 
230O Local excision & removal of int fix devices of hip & femur, short therapy 
230 Local excision & removal of int fix devices of hip & femur 
231O Local excision & removal of int fix devices except hip & femur, short therapy 
231 Local excision & removal of int fix devices except hip & femur 
232O Arthroscopy, short therapy 
232 Arthroscopy 
233 Other musculoscelet sys & conn tiss o. r. proc w cc 
234O Other musculoscelet system & connective tissue o. r. procedures, short therapy 
234 Other musculoscelet sys & conn tiss o. r. proc w/o cc 
257 Total mastectomy for malignancy w cc 
258O Total mastectomy for malignancy, short therapy 
258 Total mastectomy for malignancy w/o cc 
259 Subtotal mastectomy for malignancy w cc 
260O Subtotal mastectomy for malignancy, short therapy 
260 Subtotal mastectomy for malignancy w/o cc 
261O Breast proc for non-malignancy except biopsy & local excision, short therapy 
261 Breast proc for non-malignancy except biopsy & local excision 
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262O Breast biopsy & local excision for non-malignancy, short therapy 
262 Breast biopsy & local excision for non-malignancy 
265 Skin graft &/or debrid except for skin ulcer or cellulitis w cc 
266O Skin graft &/or debrid for skin ulcer or cellulitis, short therapy 
266 Skin graft &/or debrid except for skin ulcer or cellulitis w/o cc 
267O Perianal & pilonidal procedures, short procedures 
267 Perianal & pilonidal procedures 
268O Skin & subcutaneus tissue plastic procedures, short therapy 
268 Skin & subcutaneus tissue plastic procedures 
269 Other skin & subcut tiss proc w cc 
270O Other skin & subcutaneous tissue procedures, short therapy 
270 Other skin & subcut tiss proc w/o cc 
286O Adrenal & pituitary procedures, short therapy 
286 Adrenal & pituitary procedures 
288A Gastroinstestinal procedure for obesity 
288B Other procedure for obesity 
288O Gastrointestinal procedure for obesity, short therapy 
288P Other procedure for obesity, short therapy 
291O Thyroglossal procedures, short therapy 
291 Thyroglossal procedures 
292 Other endocrine, nutritional or metabolic disease o. r. procedure w cc 
293O Other endocrine, nutritional or metabolic disease o. r. procedure, short therapy 
293 Other endocrine, nutritional or metabolic disease o. r. procedure w/o cc 
303 Kidney, ureter & major bladder procedures for neoplasm 
304 Kidney, ureter & major bladder procedures for non-neopl w cc 
305O Kidney, ureter & major bladder procedures, short therapy 
305 Kidney, ureter & major bladder procedures for non-neopl w/o cc 
308 Minor bladder procedures w cc 
309O Minor bladder procedures, short therapy 
309 Minor bladder procedures w/o cc 
310 Transurethral procedures w cc 
311O Transurethral procedures, short therapy 
311 Transurethral procedures w/o cc 
312 Urethral procedures, age > 17 w cc 
313 Urethral procedures, age > 17 w/o cc 
314O Urethral procedures, short therapy 
314 Urethral procedures, age  0-17 
315O Other kidney & urinary tract o. r. procedures, short therapy 
315 Other kidney & urinary tract o. r. procedures 
336 Transurethral prostatectomy w cc 
337O Transurethral prostatectomy, short therapy 
337 Transurethral prostatectomy w/o cc 
338 Testes procedures for malignancy 
339 Testes procedures for non-malignancy, age > 17 
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340O Testes procedures, short therapy 
340 Testes procedures for non-malignancy, age 0-17 
341O Penis procedures, short therapy 
341 Penis procedures 
342 Circumcision, age > 17 
343O Circumcision, short therapy 
343 Circumcision, age 0-17 
345O Other male reproductive system o. r. procedures, short therapy 
345 Other male reproductive system o. r. procedures except for malignancy 
354 Uterine, adnexa proc for non-ovarian/adnexal malig w cc 
355O Uterine and adnexal procedures for non-ovarian/adnexal malignancy, short therapy 
355 Uterine, adnexa proc for non-ovarian/adnexal malig w/o cc 
356O Female reproductive system reconstructive procedure, short therapy 
356 Female reproductive system reconstructive procedure 
357O Uterine & adnexa proc for ovarian or adnexal non-malignancy, short therapy 
357 Uterine & adnexa proc for ovarian or adnexal malignancy 
358 Uterine & adnexa proc for ovarian or adnexal non-malignancy w cc 
359O Uterine and adnexal procedures for non-ovarian/adnexal malignancy, short therapy 
359 Uterine & adnexa proc for ovarian or adnexal non-malignancy w/o cc 
360O Vagina, cervix & vulva procedures , short therapy 
360 Vagina, cervix & vulva procedures 
361O Gynecological laparoscopy or  sterilization in laparatomy, short therapy 
361 Gynecological laparoscopy or sterilization in laparatomy 
363 D&c, conization & radio-implant, for malignancy 
364O D&c, conization, for non-malignancy , short therapy 
364 D&c, conization, for non-malignancy 
365O Other female reproductive system o. r. procedures, short therapy 
365 Other female reproductive system o. r. procedures 
377O Postpartum & post abortion diagnoses w o. r. procedure, short therapy 
377 Postpartum & post abortion diagnoses w o. r. procedure 
381O Abortion, short therapy 
381 Abortion w d&c, aspiration curettage or hysterotomy 
392 Splenectomy age > 17 
394O Other o. r. procedures of the blood and blood forming organ, short therapy 
394 Other o. r. procedures of the blood and blood forming organ 
401 Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia w other o. r. proc w cc 
402O Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia w o. r. procedures, short therapy 
402 Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia w other o. r. proc w/o cc 
408O Myeloprolif disord or poorly diff neopl w other o. r. proc, short therapy 
408 Myeloprolif disord or poorly diff neopl w other o. r. proc 
415O Procedure for infectious & parasitic diseases, short therapy 
415 Procedure for infectious & parasitic diseases 
424N O. r. procedure w principal diagnos of mental illness or abuse 
424O O. r. procedure w principal diagnosis of mental illness, short therapy 
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439 Skin grafts for injuries 
441O Hand procedures for injuries, short therapy 
441 Hand procedures for injuries 
442O Major operation for complication of care, short therapy 
442 Other o. r. procedures for injuries w cc 
443O Other o. r. procedures for injuries, short therapy 
443 Other o. r. procedures for injuries w/o cc 
458O Non-extensive burns w shin graft, short therapy 
458 Non-extensive burns w skin graft 
459O Non-extensive burns w wound debridement or other o. r. proc , short therapy 
459 Non-extensive burns w wound debridement or other o. r. proc 
461O O. r. proc w diagnoses of other contact w health services, short therapy 
461 O. r. proc w diagnoses of other contact w health services 
493 Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o c. d. e. w cc 
494O Cholecystectomy, short therapy 
494 Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o c. d. e. w/o cc 
501A Reconstruction of breast with cc 
501B Reconstruction of breast w/o cc 
501O Reconstruction of breast, short therapy 
502 Mastectomy and reconstruction of breast for malignancy 
509O Other procedure for breast problem, short therapy 
509 Other procedure for breast problem 
521O Simple correction of obstructive apnoe 
521 Simple correction of obstructive apnoe 
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire 
Kartlegging av avtaler mellom RHF og private, kommersielle sykehus 
A. Avtaler med private, kommersielle sykehus (A1 og A2 besvares i skjema 1): 
1. Hvor mange avtaler med private, kommersielle sykehus overtok RHF av fylkene 
pr 1.1.2002, og hvor mange avtaler hadde RHF-ene kontrakt med per 1.7.2002 og 
per 1.1 i årene 2003-2007?  
2. Hvilke utgifter (totalt) er utbetalt på årsbasis i forbindelse med disse avtalene? For 
2007 gis et anslag. 
 
Skjema 1. (A1) Antall avtaler per 1.1 
(og 1.7.2002) 
(A2) Sum utgifter på 
avtalene (1000 kr) 
1.1.2002   
1.7.2002   
2003   
2004   
2005   
2006   
2007   
 
B. Budsjettprosesser og kontrakter (B1 og B2 besvares i skjema 2, B3 i skjema 3): 
1. Hvordan var budsjettprosessen med de private, kommersielle sykehusene 
organisert? Vi skiller her mellom tre typer av budsjettprosesser:  
 
- Kostnadssammenlikninger (K): Budsjett basert på sammenlikninger i kostnader 
med andre aktører – offentlige eller private -  men uten selektive kontrakter 
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- Anbudskonkurranse (A): Budsjett basert på kostnadssammenlikninger med andre 
aktører (offentlige eller private), selektive kontrakter 
- Ingen kostnadssammenlikninger ble utført 
 
2.  Hvordan var avtalene/kontraktene utformet? Vi skiller her mellom fire ulike 
kontraktstyper: 
- Ingen restriksjoner på budsjettstørrelse og aktivitet (alternativ 1) 
- Restriksjoner på budsjettstørrelse, men ikke på aktivitet (alternativ 2) 
- Ikke restriksjoner på budsjettstørrelse, restriksjoner på aktivitet (alternativ 3) 
- Restriksjoner på både budsjettstørrelse og aktivitet (alternativ 4) 
 
Skjema 2 Budsjettprosesser Avtaler 
Høst 2001   
Høst 2002   
Høst 2003   
Høst 2004   
Høst 2005   
Høst 2006   
Andre kommentarer   
Vi antar at budsjettprosessene kjøres hver høst for det etterfølgende budsjettår. 
Dersom det er avvik fra denne regelen, for eksempel mer langsiktige avtaler, så gjør 
oppmerksom på det. 
3. Dersom K eller A under budsjettprosesser:  
i. Hvilke kriterier har RHF lagt til grunn når en har vurdert kostnadsforskjeller 
mellom private, kommersielle sykehus og mellom offentlige og private, 
kommersielle sykehus?  
ii. Hvilke utfordringer ser RHF når det gjelder vurdering av kostnads- og 
kvalitetsforskjeller mellom offentlige og private, kommersielle sykehus? 
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iii. Hvis A:  
a. Hvor mange la inn anbud? 
b. Er det andre forhold ved konkurransesituasjonen som bør nevnes? 
 
Skjema 3. (hvis for liten plass; legg ved svarene) 
i.) 
ii.) 
iii.) 
 
C. Resultater (besvares i skjema 4, eventuelt legg ved svarene)   
1. Har det, evt. som følge av endringer i enhetskostnadene, skjedd vridninger i 
aktiviteten i de private sykehusene? 
 
2. Er det andre forhold ved kostnadsutvikling eller aktivitet som er verdt å nevne? 
 
Skjema 4 (Hvis for liten plass; legg ved svarene) 
C1.) 
C2.) 
 
D. Avtalene 
Vi ber om å få tilsendt kopi av alle avtaler mellom RHF og de private, kommersielle 
sykehusene som er inngått i perioden 2002-2006/7 (se omtale i følgebrevet). Avtalene 
må inneholde informasjon om pris eller eventuelt om budsjett og volum. 
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E. Kontakt 
Til siste ber vi om navn, e-post og telefonnummer til den som har fylt ut dette 
skjemaet. 
Kontaktinformasjon 
Navn 
E-post 
Telefonnummer 
 
 
